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We must begin by noting that we endorse Reformed Epistemology, defined 
by McNabb as the claim “that a subject S’s religious belief can be justified 
or warranted apart from argumentation.” This is, of course, because we 
think that subjects are justified in believing propositions that seem true to 
them so long as they lack defeaters (regardless of whether they are capable 
of mounting arguments for such propositions—let  alone arguments that 
others would find satisfactory). McNabb, on the other hand, supports 
the thesis of Reformed Epistemology by defending a Plantingian proper 
functionalist account of warrant. And it is toward this Plantingian version of 
Reformed Epistemology that we will offer two concerns. First, we question 
the sufficiency of the proper functionalist account of warrant. Second, we 
argue that even if this account of warrant were satisfactory, Phenomenal 
Conservatism retains an important dialectical advantage over this account.
§1 An Objection to Proper
Functionalism
McNabb and Plantinga’s proper functionalist account of warrant (warrant 
being understood as whatever turns true belief into knowledge) claims 
that S’s belief that p is warranted if and only if (i) S’s belief that p results 
Proper Functionalism 129
129
from a properly functioning cognitive system, (ii) the cognitive system is 
operating in a similar environment to the one for which it was designed, (iii) 
the cognitive system is aimed at the production of true beliefs, and (iv) the 
system’s design plan is such that there is a high objective probability that p is 
true. We think, however, that a subject could have a true belief that p meet 
conditions i–iv, and yet not know that p. That is, we think conditions i–iv 
insufficient for warrant.
Imagine a subject named Skyler. Skyler has a newfound belief in God’s 
existence. The experience that triggered Skyler’s theistic belief was, oddly 
enough, the observing of yard kitsch—in particular, those iconic plastic 
pink flamingos designed by Don Featherstone in 1957. To Skyler, there is 
nothing about these flamingos that indicates God’s existence. This new belief 
feels like a random hunch to her. Let us add that Skyler took a psychedelic 
drug earlier that she knows can induce random beliefs of just this sort. From 
Skyler’s perspective, there is simply no indication that her belief is likely to 
be true. Realizing this, Skyler tries to stop believing but finds she cannot 
rid herself of this apparently baseless conviction. Despite all of this, Skyler’s 
belief was not produced by the drug, nor was it entirely random. In actual 
fact, God designed Skyler to form an irresistible belief in His existence 
whenever she encounters that precise sort of yard kitsch. Thus, Skyler’s belief 
meets conditions i–iv and, according to Proper Functionalism, is thereby 
warranted.1 But, contra Proper Functionalism, Skyler’s belief does not seem 
to constitute knowledge that God exists.
What is lacking is some indication from Skyler’s own perspective that her 
belief is true. There needs to be some intelligible connection between the 
content of her belief and that on which it is based. Skyler’s belief, however, 
is based on an experience whose content bears no discernible relation to 
God’s existence. What we are proposing is that a fifth condition is necessary 
for warrant—namely, that the belief is based on a body of evidence that, 
on-balance, indicates the truth of that belief from the first-person perspective. 
A belief must result from proper functioning and be based on good evidence 
in order to constitute knowledge.
Phenomenal Conservatism explains how this fifth condition can be met 
by basic beliefs, even though they are not based on evidence from other 
propositions. On Phenomenal Conservatism, the subject’s seeming that p 
gives the subject evidence for p. Thus, if it seems to you that the Steelers just 
scored a touchdown, then you have some evidence that the Steelers just scored 
a touchdown. Assuming you have no evidence to oppose this, a belief based 
on that seeming will satisfy the fifth condition on warrant. The key is that 
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the content of your belief (unlike Skyler’s) is intelligibly connected to the 
experience on which it is based.
Now, on Plantinga’s model, the content of the triggering experience 
doesn’t ultimately matter. His SD is a simple “input–output device” in which 
certain experiences are designed to trigger theistic belief.2 Given the right 
design plan, then, any experience could lend warrant to a theistic belief. 
It is telling, however, that the stock Plantingian examples are of starry 
skies, majestic mountains, and tiny flowers. These experiences all seem to 
bear an intelligible connection to theistic belief: such beauty and apparent 
design evidence (at least weakly) an intelligent designer. We suspect that, 
had Plantinga chosen yard kitsch as his go-to example, fewer people would 
have intuited that the resulting beliefs were warranted. Instead, he chose 
experiences that bear an intelligible connection to God, allowing the fifth 
condition on warrant to go unnoticed.
§2 A Dialectical Advantage
Even if our first critique is mistaken, and the proper functionalist account 
of warrant does not need a fifth condition, there remains a weakness in 
McNabb’s defense of Reformed Epistemology. Reformed Epistemology, once 
again, is to be understood as the claim that certain religious beliefs can be 
warranted or justified apart from argumentation.
McNabb’s defense of Proper Functionalism, if successful, establishes the 
following conditional:
 (1) If God exists and has given us a sensus divinitatis, then theistic belief
can be warranted apart from argumentation.
Notice that this conditional does not assert the truth of Reformed 
Epistemology. It says that Reformed Epistemology is true if we have a God-
given SD. Defending this conditional was useful for Plantinga’s purpose: to 
defend religious belief against the claim that it is epistemically subpar even 
if God exists. For, in light of this conditional, you cannot show that theistic 
belief is unwarranted without showing that it is false. McNabb, on the other 
hand, is trying to argue that Reformed Epistemology is true. Thus, to complete 
his defense, McNabb needs to provide evidence for both (i) that God exists 
and (ii) that God gave us an SD.3 We think that the case for (1) is strong and 
that there is much to be said for (2), but until he provides evidence for these 
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claims, McNabb has not established Reformed Epistemology’s assertion that 
theistic belief can be warranted without arguments.
This problem highlights a serious dialectical advantage of the Phenomenal 
Conservative approach. On Phenomenal Conservatism, even an atheist 
could agree that theistic beliefs are sometimes noninferentially justified.4 
If it seems to someone that God exists, and she does not possess lasting 
defeaters for these strong seemings (challenges arise, we can imagine, but 
reflection repeatedly assuages her doubts), then Phenomenal Conservatism 
says that her theistic belief is justified without argumentation, even if God 
does not exist. Accordingly, Phenomenal Conservatives can argue for 
Reformed Epistemology without the burden of establishing God’s existence 
(or His bestowal of a special religious faculty).5 If, however, we seek to 
support Reformed Epistemology by an appeal to Proper Functionalism, 
then it becomes incumbent to argue that God exists and that He is likely 
to give us something like the SD. For on current proper functionalist 
models, atheists should not agree that religious beliefs can be warranted 
apart from arguments.6 Phenomenal Conservatism, therefore, makes it 
considerably easier to argue for Reformed Epistemology than McNabb’s 
Proper Functionalist approach.
Notes
 1. Notice that Skyler’s knowledge that her theistic belief may be the result of a
psychedelic drug does not constitute a defeater given Proper Functionalism. 
This is because Skyler’s continued belief in light of that knowledge is a part
of the reliable, truth-aimed design plan given to her by God.
 2. Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief, 174–5.
 3. He may also need to show that our typical theistic beliefs are actually the
result of the sensus divinitatis rather than some other cognitive process.
 4. You’ll notice that Phenomenal Conservatism is about justification, not
warrant. This shift in focus is part of why Phenomenal Conservatism
possesses the dialectical advantaged spelled out here.
 5. To see this approach in action, see McAllister and Dougherty, “Reforming
Reformed Epistemology.”
 6. Plantinga states that if God does not exist, then belief in His existence
is probably not warranted. See Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief;
however, if Proper Functionalists adopt the model of the sensus divinitatis
developed in McAllister and Dougherty’s “Reforming Reformed
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Epistemology” then they might be able to maintain that religious beliefs 
have some degree of warrant—albeit a degree falling sort of that which is 
required for knowledge—even if God does not exist. See footnote 21 of the 
aforementioned article.
